A new approach to attack A5/1 is proposed. The proposed attack is a refinement of a previous attack by Ekdahl and Johansson. We make two important observations that lead to a new attack with improved performance.
Introduction
The security of GSM conversation is based on usage of the A5 family of stream ciphers. Many hundred million customers in Europe are protected from the overthe-air piracy by the stronger version in this family, the A5/1 stream cipher. Other customers on other markets use the weaker version A5/2. The approximate design of A5/1 was leaked in 1994, and in 1999 the exact design of both A5/1 and A5/2 was discovered by Briceno [1] . As the result, a lot of investigations of the A5 stream ciphers were done.
The first analysis of the A5/1 cipher resulted in "Guess-and-Determine" type of attacks [2] . Then a time-memory trade-off attack was proposed by Biryukov, Shamir, and Wagner [3] , which in some cases can break A5/1 in seconds. Unfortunately, it needs to use a huge precomputational time and about 4 × 73Gb of hard memory. The attack complexity grows exponentially depending on the length of the LFSRs in the design of the cipher. Another attack was presented by Biham and Dunkelman [4] . Their attack breaks the cipher within 2 39.91 A5/1 clocking assuming 2 20.8 bits of keystream available. This attack has expensive assymptotic behaviour. In 2002, Krause, [5] presented a general attack on LFSR-based stream ciphers, called BDD-based cryptanalysis. This attack requires computation complexity of n O(1) 2 an , a < 1 polynomial time operations, where a is a constant depending on the cipher and n is the combined shift registers length. For A5/1, the attack achieves a = 0.6403, so the complexity is again exponential in the shift registers length.
A completely different way to attack A5/1 was proposed by Ekdahl and Johansson in 2001 [6] . The attack needs a few minutes for computations, and 2-5 minutes of conversation (plaintext). The idea behind the attack came from correlation attacks. This is the only attack for which the complexity does not grow exponentially with the shift register length.
Finally, very recently Barkan, Biham and Keller [7] investigated the usage of the A5 ciphers in GSM. They demonstrated an active attack where a false base station can intercept a conversation and perform a man in the middle attack. By asking for usage of the weak A5/2 algorithm in the conversation with the base station and then breaking it, the false base station finds the session key which is also used in the A5/1 protected conversation with the mobile unit. In [7] the authors also propose the passive memory-time trade-off ciphertext only attack. As one of the examples, if 5 minutes of conversation is available, then the attack needs one year of precomputations with 140 computers working together, 22×200GBs hard discs. Then the attack can be done in time 2
28 by one PC. Obviously, the authors did not try to implement the attack and the complexity was just estimated.
In this paper a new approach to attack the A5/1 stream cipher is proposed. We consider the Ekdahl-Johansson attack as the basis, and apply several new improvements. As the result, the new attack now needs only less then 1 minute of computations, and a few seconds of known conversation. It does not need any notable precomputation time, and needs reasonable space of operation memory.
For the case of a ciphertext-only attack on A5/1, we use the fact that some redundancy is part of the plaintext. There are at least two kinds of redundancy that are explicit and may be used in an attack where only ciphertext is available. The first kind is the fact that coding is done before encryption, which results in linear relationships in the plaintext since the parity check symbols are also encrypted. This observation was used in [7] . The second kind of redundancy is the fact that during silence, a special frame including a large number of zeros is sent [8] . Silence occurs very often, but unfortunately these frames used for silence are transmitted less frequently, one to initialise a period of silence and then two each second. The attack that we propose can be considered in a ciphertext-only scenario, in which case we use this redundancy during silence to get some known outputs from the cipher.
Although several of the previous attacks are sufficient to break A5/1 in a known plaintext attack, we believe that further progress is very important. The A5/1 stream cipher is perhaps the most used cipher in the world, and from the wireless communication channel interception of the communication is very easy. Mobile base stations are not expensive to buy and they can be used to record GSM conversations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a short description of the cipher A5/1 is given. The basic Ekdahl-Johansson attack on A5/1 is briefly described in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we give new ideas to improve the attack in general. The details and particulars of the attack simulations are described in Section 4.2. Then in Section 5 the results of our simulations are presented.
Description of A5/1
A GSM conversation between A and B is a sequence of frames, each sent in about 4.6 milliseconds. Each frame consists of 228 bits -114 bits of which is the message from A to B, and the second half bits are representing communication from B to A. One session is encrypted with a secret session key K. For the jth frame the running key generator is initialised with mixture of K and the publicly known frame counter, denoted by F j . It then generates 228 bits of running key for the current frame. The ciphertext is a binary xor of the running key and the plaintext.
A5/1 consists of 3 LFSRs of lengths 19, 22, and 23, which are denoted R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 , respectively. The LFSRs are clocked in an irregular fashion. Each of them has one tap-bit, C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 , respectively. In each step, 2 or 3 LFSRs are clocked, depending on the current values of the bits C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 . Thus, the clocking control device implevalues of clocking
ments the majority rule, shown in the table on the right. Note, for each step the probability that an individual LFSR is being clocked is 3/4. After the initialisation procedure for the LFSRs, 228 bits of running key are produced, using irregular clocking. In each step one bit of the running key is calculated as the binary xor of the current output bits from the LFSRs.
The initialisation process uses the session key K and the known frame counter F n . First the LFSRs are initialised to zero. They are then clocked 64 times, ignoring the irregular clocking, and the key bits of K are consecutively xored in parallel to the feedback of each of the registers. In the second step the LFSRs are clocked 22 times, ignoring the irregular clocking, and the successive bits of F n are again xored in parallel to the feedback of the LFSRs. Let us call the state of LFSRs at this time the initial state of the frame. In the third step the LFSRs are clocked 100 times with irregular clocking, but ignoring outputs. Then, the LFSRs are clocked 228 times with the irregular clocking, producing 228 bits of the running key. For a more detailed description of A5/1 we refer to [1] . 
Note, that u
is a linear combination of K and F j bits, since all operations before the initial state are linear. I.e., u
With the same arguments we define
where X a,la (F j ) and the coefficients y a,la,i ∈ F 2 , for a = 1, 2, 3, l a = 0, 1, . . . , 100+ 228, i = 1, . . . , 64 are precomputed and fixed. Let us write
Our target is to estimate 19 bits from the first LFSR s 1 (0), . . . , s 1 (18), 22 bits from the second LFSR s 2 (0), . . . , s 2 (21), and 23 bits from the third LFSR s 3 (0), . . . , s 3 (22). These 64 bits map one-to-one to 64 bits of the key K, if the frame counter F j is given.
For notation purposes we write E p =Ê, whenÊ appears to be an estimator for E, such that Pr{E =Ê} = p, for some probability p.Ê can be derived from accessible data, or assumed (guessed).
One can think about the data we have access to as a binary table of m frames in the form ⎛
The idea behind the attack is to observe that v j (101) 
Let us now define the known valueÔ
The case whenÔ
a) The LFSRs are really clocked l 1 , l 2 , l 3 at time t, happening with probability Pr{(l 1 , l 2 , l 3 ) at time t}. If so, the expression will be true with probability 1. b) If the condition in a) is not fulfilled, the expression will still be true with probability 1/2.
This means that the relation (3) is biased (p > 1/2).
From the given frames we can estimate many of the linear combinations
. But we only need 64 correct estimates in order to recover the key K uniquely.
To minimise the amount of frames m and perform the estimation with low probability of error, Ekdahl and Johansson suggested to use the values of
. They used the expression
This probability gives the estimation of the corresponding linear combination for one frame j. We will increase the possibility to estimate the value of
. . 328) are given, as each of them provides some small contribution. By calculating the likelihood ratio
we achieve a likelihood value (estimate) which is taken over all m frames. This can be turned into a binary estimate by
where p > 0.5 depends mainly on m. In [6] the authors finally examine different strategies for implementing the recovery of the key bits as efficient as possible.
Explaining the New Attack
In this section we describe our discovered improvements in general. Our main purpose is to reduce the number of frames m, which is needed for the attack.
Statistical Analysis of m Frames
We mentioned before that we have identified two general ideas for improving the previous results. The first is the fact that it is beneficial to study the derivative sequences instead of the sequences themselves. Assume that at time t the LFSRs are clocked l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 times, respectively. Then we also assume that at time t + 1 the third LFSR is not clocked. In this case we have the equalities,
Then the probability Pr{Ô
at time t} so it gives us a larger bias when estimating the value of linear combinations of s i (l i )'s. Below is a comparison of these probabilities. The first idea to improve the attack is then to consider two consecutive expressions (4) . Their sum only depends on two LFSRs, and the probability of the event is higher than before. We also note that we can similarly assume that LFSR-1 and LFSR-2 are not clocked at some time t. This gives us 3 cases. We define
The case when 3ẑ j l1,l2 (t) is equal to the value
a) The first and the second LFSRs are indeed clocked l 1 , l 2 times at time t occuring with probability Pr{(l 1 , l 2 ) at time t}, AND at time t + 1 the third LFSR is not clocked, with probability 1/4. The expression is always true in this case. b) If the condition in a) is not fulfilled the expression will still be true with probability 1/2.
The second idea is to consider d consecutive estimators jointly as one ddimension estimator. If we look at the sequence of d estimators of the form
, then we note that they are dependent on each other. To use this fact we suggest to consider not binary expressions, but vectors of d bits. Introduce a new d-bits vector, derived from the frame j,
. . .
Define the d-dimension vector 3 S l1,l2 (which is unknown for the attacker) as
Then, from (5) it follows that
with some biased probability p. Note that the symbols are now of alphabet size 2 d . Examining this in more detail, consider d consecutive irregular steps. The total number of possible scenarios is 4 d , since in each step one of four types of irregular clockings can be chosen, according to the bits C 1 , C 2 , C 3 . If we assume that at time t the first and the second LFSRs are clocked exactly l 1 , l 2 times, then we can classify the bits of the vector 3Ẑ j l1,l2 (t). They can be either Correct (i.e., the next clocking is the required one so the bit has the same value as the corresponding bit in the vector 3 S l1,l2 ), or Random (i.e., the bit can be 0 or 1, with probability 1/2 
12 . Continuing in this way, the complete table for Pr{E d } can be derived. The distribution for d = 4 is given as in the 
All the m frames give us a more precise estimation: Our task is then to select a set of "guessed" keysK with maximum probabilities, and then perform a test whether the real key K can be one of the selected. More details depend on the exact structure of simulations, which we discuss in the next section.
Creating Candidate Tables of s(l)-Sequences
In the previous subsection we have found how to create a distribution table for d-dimension random variables r S li,lj . If we have h such distributions, then a "guessed" keyK is measured by its probability, as described above. We are now faced with the problem of how to select the most likelyK's in an efficient way. For this purpose we partly use the idea that was introduced in the EkdahlJohansson attack, but in a modified way. In this section we show the technical details of searching for the bestK's, and focus on computation aspects.
The idea is that first we choose some interval I 1 = [I 1,a . . . I 1,b ] and then we construct h 1 distribution tables for 3 S l1,l2 , where l 1 , l 2 ∈ I 1 . I.e., the number of distribution tables will be h 1 = (I 1,b − I 1,a + 1) 2 , and the number of s 1 (l)'s and s 2 (l)'s that are involved in the linear expressions for 3 S l1,l2 is 2· (I 1,b −I 1,a +1+d ), see formula (7) .
Let us consider some choice of values for s 1 (I 1,a ) , . . . , s 1 (I 1,b +d), s 2 (I 1,a ) , . . . , s 2 (I 1,b + d) to be a pair of vectors (S 1,I1 , S 2,I1 ) (note, the vector of interest ends with I 1,b + d, rather then I 1,b + d − 1; the reason can be seen from (7), where l 1 , l 2 ∈ I 1 ), i.e., (s 1 (I 1,a ) , . . . , s 1 (I 1,b + d), s 2 (I 1,a ) , . . . , s 2 
The measure of the choice is the probability mass defined as l1,l2∈I1
Now, by exhaustive search the most likely r pairs (S 1,I1 , S 2,I1 ) form a set
The size of the exhaustive search is 2
. In a similar way we can perform the same exhaustive search to create the sets To understand better how the exhaustive search for 3 Ì I1 is done, one can think of the matrix multiplication: 
where for every "guessed" vector (S 1,I1 , S 2,I1 ) (exhaustive search) the set of vectors 3 S l1,l2 p = 3 Z l1b,l2 is determined uniquely by the matrix multiplication. We can then calculate the value of our choice by formula (12). After that, the most likely r pairs are selected and stored in the list (or table) 3 Ì I1 .
Recall that to recover the key K uniquely, we need to have 64 bits: 19 bits of s 1 (l)'s, 22 bits of s 2 (l)'s, and 23 bits of s 3 (l)'s. It means that for d = 4 it might be enough to have only one interval I 1 of size 19. When we try to reduce the number of frames m needed for the attack, then there are two reasons for why this simple scenario is not working: a) to create one likelihood table 3 Ì I1 the exhaustive search will be of size 2 2·(19+4) = 2 46 -this is practically impossible; b) when the number of frames m is reduced, then the number of candidates r must be increased significantly, so that the correct pairs are present in the tables 1 Ì I1 , 2 Ì I1 , and 3 Ì I1 . Otherwise, the joint intersection of these sets will not give us the correct triple (S 1,I1 , S 2,I1 , S 3,I1 ).
To overcome these problems, we could take I 1 of a short size, and introduce one more interval, I 2 = [I 2,a . . . I 2,b ], and then we construct two kinds of tables * Ì I1 and * Ì I2 each of size r. We need to take I 2 such that it intersects I 1 , otherwise the intersection would be r 2 , and, hence, r cannot be large. Now in a similar way we can create the sets I2 , S 3,I2 )}, and 3 Ì I2 = {(S 1,I2 , S 2,I2 )}, each containing the r most likely pairs, the measure of which is calculated similar to the formula (12). Due to the intersection
, if the end of S i,I1 corresponds to the beginning of S i,I2 ∅, otherwise the intersection of these two sets is
The larger the intersection of the intervals I 1 and I 2 , the smaller the inter- By vertical intersection we call the intersections of the form:
, and 2,3 Ì Ii , 1,3 Ì Ii are defined in a similar way. One more triple vertical intersection is defined as
Design of Intervals
Let us take one interval I 1 = [87 . . . 97]. Two extreme situations are when (l 1 , l 2 ) = (87, 87) and (l 1 , l 2 ) = (97, 97). In each frame j there are only 228 bits are accessible v j (101), . . . , v j (100 + 228). In Figure 2 we see that the probability Pr{(l 1 , l 2 ) at time t} for this interval gets its maximum value on around t ≈ (116 . . . 129). Hence, the bits around v(116) . . . v(129) give us the most information about the d-dimension vectors, when l 1 , l 2 ∈ I 1 . We can also say that for this interval the informative bits are around v(105) . . . v(145) , because for any other v's the probability is almost 0. Figure 3 the bounded densities for each interval are shown. The interval I 2 is moved to the left below t < 101, where the valuable v's are unaccessible for us. It means that this choice is not appropriate. On the other hand, the interval I 4 is moved to the right and very close to the right border of accessible v's. This interval can be considered as the last appropriate interval. Also note that as the interval is moved to the righ the amplitute decreases, i.e. the error probability of the random variables estimation is higher.
In our simulations we decided to choose the size of each interval to be 11.
Independently of the parameter d ≥ 1 in each table 3 Ì Ii we store only the pairs (S 1,Ii , S 2,Ii ) of vectors each of size 12 bits only. The schematical structure of intervals is depicted below in Figure 4 . Two neighbour intervals intersect in 6 positions, whereas the last d − 1 positions are assumed to be badly estimated (tail bits). I.e., any horizontal intersection of two tables 3 Ì Ii and 3 Ì Ii+1 will be done by 12 bits (6 bits are s 1 (I i+1 ), . . . , s 1 (I i+1 + 5), and similar 6 bits are s 2 (I i+1 ), . . . , s 2 (I i+1 + 5)). Also note that any vertical intersection will be done in 12 bits also. The choice of this structure of the intervals allowed us to introduce several efficient strategies to intersect the tables. 30 . The number of such sets * Ì Ii is 9 (3 intervals times 3 cases for '*').
In our simulations we have considered 28 intervals:
So, the last interval is I 27 = [231 . . . 241] (see also Figure 3 ). When for a chosen interval I i we estimate the probability Pr{
T } with the formula (9), then we only need to look through the bits v j that are valuable for I i . Let us set the "window" of valuable bits to be of size 64, then, for example, for the interval I 1 on the Figure 3 the "window" is t 1 = [ Case 1
The time complexity to form these data is O(3 · 28 · (11 
Strategies for Intersection of the Tables * Ì Ii
When the first part of the attack is done, the second part is just intersection of the sets until we get the set of triples 1,2,3 Ì * of appropriate size. Here are several strategies that we can follow to achieve our goal: If in some step for some intersection Ì ∩ Ì we get ∅, or a very small set, then increase the value r for Ì and Ì selectively, until their intersection give us a set of size at least r 0 , for some threshold value. Thus, we can start creating the sets * Ì Ii with a small value of r, and then increase it selectively, when necessary.
So, here is a wide choice to choose a strategy. In our simulations we have tried several of them.
Simulation Results
The attack can basically be divided into three steps, For the first two steps we present the actual time. The attack was implemented on Pentium-4, CPU 2.4GHz, 256Mb RAM, OS Windows XP Pro SP1. 1st step/ 2nd step m=2000 m=5000 m=10000 d=1 11 sec/ 18 sec 26 sec / 18 sec 58 sec / 18 sec d=2 14 sec/ 8 min 32 sec / 8 min 72 sec / 8 min d=4 40 sec/ 7 hrs 94 sec / 7 hrs 190 sec / 7 hrs
The measure of "goodness" of the attack can be expressed in terms of the number of frames m needed and its success rate. The attack was successfully implemented on a usual PC-computer, and it performs the attack from several seconds to several minutes, depending on the choice of strategy, and parameters m, d, and r.
Success rate of the attack depends on the choice of the design parameters d and r, and the strategy that is used. For some values of m and d here we present in Figure 5 the plots for the probabilities:
Pr{ the correct vector is in * Ì Ii , for given parameter r}.
When the tables are constructed, in the intersection process it is very important that the correct pair is present in the corresponding table. Otherwise, the intersection will never give us a correct key.
In Figure 5 we show the real estimated success rates for different strategies, with different number of frames m and the attack design parameter d. In Figure 5 (upper left) consider the curve corresponding to d = 1 and to Strategy I, when m = 10000 frames. For r = 15000 we have the success rate of the attack around 58%, whereas for Strategies II-IV the success rate is almost 100%. From the plots below the Strategy IV looks the most attractive. In this strategy we need to intersect only 4 tables, but the disadvantage is that there is no horizontal intersection. And then after two vertical intersections we need to try all possible combinations of elements in two tables. One more disadvantage is that we could get some equation dependencies between two intervals, so then the actual time complexity will grow. On the contrary, strategy III looks the next the most attractive, and there are no problems with intervals. Since there are no horizontal intersections in these strategies, this forces us to reduce the parameter r significantly. The critical value of this parameter is r cr = 10000, and the optimal is r opt = 2000 from the computational and memory points of view. Strategy II avoids such problems mostly because of the presence of vertical intersections, which are intersecting on 12 bits.
A practical solution to overcome the time-memory problems related to intersections of the tables can be the use of the Heuristic Strategy V, combined with one of the previous strategies. The idea of Heuristic is to control the size of the intersection. If the size is likely to be increased by some threshold criteria, then try to increase the initial parameter r until the limit is reached, or solution is found. Heuristic can also control the size of the tables independently, and this will give the best performance of the attack.
Dramatic advantage of use the proper design parameter d is seen in the same Figure 5 . To make the advantage clearer, the bottom right subplot shows how much we gain when d is 1, 2, and 4. When r = 15000, the change of the parameter d from d = 1 to d = 2 significantly increases the success rate from 58% to 70%. These simulations were done for m = 10000 frames, and with the application of Strategy I.
Finally 
Conclusions
We have demonstrated how two new ideas provide improved performance for a correlation attack against A5/1. In simulation we get a high success rate for only 2000-5000 frames, using very little computation. But there is still deviation in performance depending on the strategies we choose, which means that there may very well be further improvements to come if we can find the best attack strategies. Another interesting topic is to examine how small m can be made if we allow a substantial increase in attack complexity. If m can be decreased a bit further, ciphertext only attack may be practically possible, as discussed briefly in the introduction of the paper.
